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The Slow Death of the Reasonable Steps Requirement for the Mistake of Age Defence 
Isabel Grant* 
forthcoming (2021) Manitoba Law Journal 
This article examines the demise of the “all reasonable steps” requirement in s. 150.1(4) of the 
Criminal Code which limits an accused’s ability to assert a mistaken belief in age as a defence to 
sexual offences against children where he has failed to take such steps. The article demonstrates 
that the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R v Carbone has rendered this requirement meaningless in 
Ontario. Even where the Crown has met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
accused did not take “all reasonable steps” to ascertain age, the Crown must still go on and prove 
mens rea as to the fact that the complainant was under the age of consent. The article argues that, 
where there is no suggestion that a legislative provision is unconstitutional, courts should not use 
statutory interpretation to effectively read a legislative provision out of existence, especially where 
it was intended to protect children from sexual contact with adults.  
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A.      Background 
B.      The “All Reasonable Steps” Issue 
C.       Analysis 
D.      Extending Carbone to Mistaken Beliefs in Consent 




Adolescents face sexual violence at alarming rates in Canada. In 2012, 55% of 
complainants in police-reported sexual offences were under the age of 17 even though this group 
represented only 20% of the population.1 As the Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged in 
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Wong, Deborah Trotchine, and Katrin Iacono for their diligent research assistance on this paper and Janine Benedet 
and Elizabeth Sheehy for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. This research was supported by a grant from the 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. 
1 See Statistics Canada, Police-Reported Sexual Offences Against Children and Youth in Canada, 2012, by 
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the sentencing context, the intersecting vulnerabilities of being young and female result in girls 
bearing a disproportionate burden of sexual violence against children.2 The Court went out of its 
way to describe the particular risks (and stereotypes) facing adolescent girls3 and to highlight the 
degree to which the legislative regime enacted to deal with these offences is focused on “the 
personal autonomy, bodily integrity, sexual integrity, dignity, and equality of children.”4  
But progress in sentencing is meaningless if judges consistently erect new barriers to 
effective prosecution of child sexual offences. This article addresses the latest such barrier imposed 
by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R v Carbone.5 In Carbone, the Court held that the 
requirement in the Criminal Code that an accused take “all reasonable steps” to ascertain the 
complainant’s age before he can raise a defence that he mistakenly believed the child was at or 
above the age of consent (generally 16 in Canada) will no longer have any impact on the verdict 
in Ontario. Even where the Crown successfully proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused 
did not take “all reasonable steps”, it must go on to prove that the accused knew the complainant 
was under the age of consent, or was wilfully blind or reckless with respect to that fact.   
This article begins with a brief introduction to the mistake of age defence in Canada and 
the ways in which courts have slowly chipped away at its effectiveness. It then moves on to provide 
a brief review of the problematic decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Morrison6 to set 
 
Adam Cotter & Pascale Beaupré, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 28 May 2014) at 6. In 2016, 
50% of all female complainants in police-reported sexual offences were under the age of 17, with the majority 
(34%) being between the ages of 12 to 17 years-old. That same year, 73% of all male complainants in police-
reported sexual offences were under the age of 17, with 42% being under the age of 12 and 30% being adolescents. 
See Statistics Canada, Victims of Police-Reported Violent Crime in Canada: National, Provincial and Territorial 
Fact Sheets, 2016, by Mary Allen & Kylie McCarthy, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 30 May 
2018) at 7. 
2 See R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at para 68. 
3 See ibid at para 136.  
4 Ibid at para 51.  
5 2020 ONCA 394 [Carbone].  
6 2019 SCC 15 [Morrison (SCC)].  
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up the more detailed analysis of the decision in Carbone, the final death knell for reasonable steps 
regarding age in Ontario. The article argues that the Court of Appeal for Ontario had a choice to 
make in Carbone and chose the path that fully undermined the “all reasonable steps” requirement.  
Sexual assault is gendered across all ages and especially so in adolescence.7 One study 
found that under the age of 11, girls experience sexual violence at a rate almost triple that of boys; 
for girls between the ages of 12 and 17, that rate jumps to nine times higher than boys.8 Indigenous 
girls,9 girls with disabilities,10 and girls in state care11 are particularly vulnerable to sexual violence. 
Furthermore, sexual assault against boys peaks at a younger age than for girls. Specifically, sexual 
abuse against boys peaks under the age of 12,12 whereas for girls sexual abuse peaks around the 
age of 14, 13 just the age where a mistake of age defence might be more plausible.  
 
7 For example, from 2009 to 2014, 87% of all police-reported sexual assaults were committed against females and 
98% of perpetrators charged were male. See Statistics Canada, Police-Reported Sexual Assaults in Canada, 2009 to 
2014: A Statistical Profile, by Cristine Rotenberg, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 3 October 
2017) at 19. This overrepresentation is also seen in adolescents. See Cotter & Beaupré, supra note 1 at 10 (which 
found that the rate of sexual assault peaks around the age of 14).  
8 See Statistics Canada, Police-Reported Violence Against Girls and Young Women in Canada, 2017, by Shana 
Conroy, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 17 December 2018) at 6.  
9 See British Columbia, Representative for Children and Youth, Too Many Victims: Sexualized Violence in the Lives 
of Children and Youth in Care (report) (Victoria: Representative for Children and Youth, October 2016) at 1. This 
report concluded that Indigenous girls in care were more likely to experience sexual abuse than other girls and that 
the same was not true for Indigenous boys. See also Statistics Canada, Victimization of Aboriginal People in 
Canada, 2014, by Jillian Boyce, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 28 June 2016) at 10. 
10 See Statistics Canada, Violent Victimization of Women with Disabilities, 2014, by Adam Cotter, Catalogue No 85-
002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 15 May 2018) at 9: 
Women with a disability at the time of the survey were more likely to have experienced 
sexual abuse at the hands of an adult before they reached 15 years of age (Chart 4). One 
in five (18%) women with a disability were touched in a sexual way by an adult before 
the age of 15, a proportion that was double that of women without a disability (9%). 
Likewise, 12% of women with a disability reported being forced into unwanted sexual 
activity by an adult before the age of 15, compared with 5% of women without a 
disability. 
11 See Isabel Grant & Janine Benedet, “The ‘Statutory Rape’ Myth: A Case Law Study of Sexual Assaults Against 
Adolescent Girls” (2019) 31:2 CJWL 266 at 280–81. 
12 See Cotter & Beaupré, supra note 1 at 10 (which found that in 2012 “[t]he peak age at which boys were victims of 
sexual offences was 8”). 73% of all male complainants in police-reported sexual offences in 2016 were under the 
age of 17, with the largest group, 42%, being under the age of 12. See Allen & McCarthy, supra note 1 at 7.  
13 See Cotter & Beaupré, supra note 1 at 11: “[f]or girls, the rates of sexual offences generally increased with age 
before peaking at age 14”. 
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In fact, this gendered dynamic is clearly reproduced in the mistake of age case law. I 
examined 20 years of reported case law (between 2000 and 2020) across Canada on mistake of 
age defences, including all cases where there was an actual child complainant.14 This review 
revealed 117 reported cases involving the defence. More than 96% of cases involved male 
perpetrators, with only four cases involving female perpetrators.15 Similarly, 107 cases involved 
girls as complainants (91%), and 10 cases involved boys (9%), including one case where the 15-
year-old complainant was “in the process of transitioning to becoming a male” and identified as 
male.16 The gendered stereotypes underlying this defence are most evident in cases involving 
 
14 I excluded five cases involving Internet luring involving a police sting operation and thus no actual child victim. I 
also excluded cases where no outcome on the defence was reached. 
15 See R v George, 2017 SCC 38 [George (SCC)]; R v Johnson, [2001] NJ No 276, 52 WCB (2d) 456 [Johnson]; R v 
Otokiti, 2017 ONSC 5940 [Otokiti]; R v Akumu, 2017 BCSC 527 [Akumu].  
16 R v WG, 2018 ONSC 5404 at para 5. The complainant was described as identifying as a male at the time of the 
sexual offences. The defence was unsuccessful in this case on the basis that the accused had not taken all reasonable 
steps to ascertain the complainant’s age. The other cases involving boys are: George (SCC), supra note 15; Johnson, 
supra note 15; R v TSH, 2008 ABPC 281 [TSH]; R c Lévesque, 2011 QCCS 7093; R v Angel, 2019 BCCA 449 
[Angel]; R v Thompson, 2017 NBCA 62; R v Sohail, 2018 ONCJ 566; R v Crant, 2018 ONSC 1479 [Crant]; R v 
LFM, 2015 BCPC 449 [LFM].  
 
For all of the cases involving female complainants, see: Otokiti, supra note 15; Akumu, supra note 15; Carbone, 
supra note 5; R v Normand, 2014 ONSC 3861 [Normand]; R v Crosdale, 2018 ONCJ 800; R v Jat, 2019 SKQB 51; 
R v Hope, 2011 NLTD(G) 143 [Hope]; R v John, 2020 ONSC 3790 [John]; R v ET, 2010 ONSC 3913 (CanLII) 
[ET]; LSJPA – 1731, 2017 QCCQ 15023; R v Abdulkadir, 2018 ABPC 244; R v A(D), 2011 ONCJ 130; R v CGJ, 
2018 BCPC 216; R v Ayer, [2008] OJ No 3611, 2008 CanLII 46922; R c Bourelle Vanasse, 2020 QCCQ 2315; R v 
PDB, 2000 SJ No 348; R v Purchase, 2011 ABQB 643; R v NW, [2005] MH No 108, 4 WWR 304; R v Dunchie, 
2007 ONCA 887; R v Nakogee, 2017 ONSC 4885; R v Moazami, 2014 BCSC 1727; R v RKD, 2012 ABPC 205; R v 
Poirier, 2011 ABPC 350 [Poirier]; R v Singh et al, 2020 MBCA 61; R v HL, 2017 ONSC 6205; R v Saliba, 2019 
ONCA 22; R v Kim, 2004 BCCA 57 [Kim]; R v Gonzales, 2011 BCPC 353; R v Skunk, 2010 ONCJ 209; R v DRD, 
2020 ABPC 46; R v Konneh, 2019 ABQB 3; R v Silavi, 2019 BCCA 366; R v Duran, 2013 ONCA 343 [Duran]; R v 
Coburn, 2019 NSPC 49 [Coburn]; R v Wrigley, 2018 NWTSC 67 [Wrigley]; R v Chapais, 2017 ONSC 120 
[Chapais]; R v MB, 2017 ONSC 4163; R v Ryder, 2011 BCSC 133; R v Beckford, 2016 ONSC 1066; R v Hubert, 
2016 BCPC 288; R v Holloway, 2013 ONCA 374 [Holloway]; R v Arook, 2016 ABQB 528; R v Ekendia, 2011 
NWTTC 17; R v Audet, 2020 ONSC 5039; R v Azonwanna, 2020 ONSC 1513; R v Hudon, 2010 OJ No 6023; R v 
Merrlles, 2016 SKCA 128; R v Gashikanyi, 2015 ABCA 1; R v Piche, 2018 ABQB 980; R v Lefthand, 2019 ABPC 
127 [Lefthand]; R v UHC, 2015 NSPC 10; R v DO, 2017 ONSC 2027 [DO]; R v E, 2011 NUCJ 35 [R v E]; R v 
Quinones, 2012 BCCA 94; R v (R), 2014 ONCJ 96 [R v (R)]; R v Mabior, 2010 MBCA 93; R v MGB, 2005 ABPC 
215; R v JM, [2017] NJ No 223, 2017 NLTD(G) 110; R v Budden, 2014 NJ No 78; R v Young, [2010] NJ No 264, 
2010 CarswellNfld 421; R v Ross, 2012 NSCA 56; R v Hussein, 2017 ONSC 2584; R v GL, 2014 ONSC 3403; R v 
Dragos, 2012 ONCA 538 [Dragos]; LSJPA – 1728, 2017 QCCQ 13555; R v Tannas, 2015 SKCA 61 [Tannas]; R v 
Eichner, 2020 ONSC 4602; R v Ford, 2017 ABQB 542; R v Dichrow, 2020 ABPC 58; R c Vasiloff, 2017 QCCQ 
15612 [Vasiloff]; R c Perreault, 2019 QCCQ 6097; R v Sims, 2006 BCSC 651; R v JTC, 2013 NSPC 88; R v TQBN, 
2016 SKQB 10 [TQBN]; R v Nguyen, 2017 SKCA 30 [Nguyen]; R v Alfred, 2020 BCCA 256 [Alfred]; R v MacLean, 
2018 NLSC 209; R v May, 2017 ONCJ 167; R v Craig, 2013 BCSC 1562; R v Gale, 2012 BCPC 456; R v MC, 
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successful defences. There were only three reported cases involving boys where the defence was 
successful, and none involving complainants who were identified in the decision as transgender or 
nonbinary.17 By contrast, there were 34 cases involving girls where the defence was successful 
and three additional cases where an appellate court overturned a conviction on the basis of errors 
regarding the defence. While these reported cases probably represent only a fraction of the actual 
cases involving the defence during this time period, it is notable that the gender breakdown is 
remarkably similar to statistics on sexual violence generally.  
This article argues that while Carbone applies to all children under the age of consent, it 
will have its greatest impact on the most marginalized girls. This argument is not meant to trivialize 
sexual violence against boys or those who identify as gender nonbinary; both groups face 
significant harm from sexual violence committed overwhelmingly by men,18 and further study is 
 
[2011] NJ No 228, 95 WCB (2d) 543; R v Garraway, 2010 ONCJ 642; R v Mangat, 2018 ABCA 309; R v Slater, 
2005 SKCA 87; R v Chapman, 2016 ONCA 310 [Chapman]; R v Saliba, 2013 ONCA 661 [Saliba (2013)]; R v CJJ, 
2020 BCPC 2; R v Cummer, 2014 MBQB 62; R v CJC, 2018 NLCA 68; R v KS, 2018 ONSC 1988; R v CIL, 2019 
ABPC 64; R v Martinez, 2020 ONCJ 303; R v CGV, 2017 ONCJ 850; R c Héon, 2019 QCCQ 5609; R v Minzen, 
2017 ONCJ 127 [Minzen]; R v Akinsuyi, 2016 ONSC 2103; R v Hall, 2018 ABQB 459; R v Powell, 2016 ONSC 
562; R v Clarke, 2016 SKCA 80; R v Beaulieu, 2016 ONCJ 280; R v Moise, 2016 SKCA 133; R v Hoffart, 2010 
ABPC 122; R v D(AJ), 2016 NSPC 74; R v Ambrus, 2014 ABPC 173; R v Mastel, 2011 SKCA 16; R c Naud, 2018 
QCCQ 4480; R v Lewis, 2015 SKQB 291 [Lewis]. 
17 See George (SCC), supra note 15; TSH, supra note 16; LFM, supra note 16. The success rate for the defence was 
slightly higher among girl complainants, but with the small number of cases involving boys it is impossible to draw 
any conclusions from this finding. 
18 Between 2009 and 2014, boys accounted for 50% of male victims of police-reported sexual assaults. See 
Rotenberg, supra note 7 at 13–14. In 2012, perpetrators of sexual assault against boys were overwhelmingly male, 
with only 2% of cases involving a female accused and a male victim. See Cotter & Beaupré, supra note 1 at 14. A 
Canadian study conducted by the Department of Justice reported that childhood sexual abuse can have “profound 
effects on a man’s identity and sexual activity”: Susan McDonald & Adamira Tijerino, “Male Survivors of Sexual 
Abuse and Assault: Their Experiences” (2013) at 7, online (pdf): Department of Justice <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-
pr/cj-jp/victim/rr13_8/rr13_8.pdf> [perma.cc/K2UJ-GJGJ]. See also Marie Choquet et al, “Self-Reported Health and 
Behavioral Problems Among Adolescent Victims of Rape in France: Results of a Cross-Sectional Survey” (1997) 
21:9 Child Abuse & Neglect 823 at 831. A more recent American study found that boys who had experienced 
childhood sexual abuse were more than twice as likely as boys who had not experienced sexual abuse to have 
attempted suicide. See Shanta R Dube et al, “Long-Term Consequences of Childhood Sexual Abuse by Gender of 
Victim” (2005) 28:5 Am J Prev Med 430 at 433. There is also evidence to suggest that children who identify as 
transgender or nonbinary face a high rate of sexual violence. See Karen Rosenberg, “Higher Prevalence of Sexual 
Assault Among Transgender and Nonbinary Adolescent Students” (2019) 119:8 American J Nursing 49. See also 
Andrea L Roberts et al, “Childhood Gender Nonconformity: A Risk Indicator for Childhood Abuse and 
Posttraumatic Stress in Youth” (2012) 129:3 Pediatrics 410 at 414. 
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warranted to identify the stereotypes that can undermine judicial decision making around these 
child victims. However, the cases under study predominantly involve male violence against girls 
and, as will be discussed below, the stereotypes invoked to support successful defences of mistaken 
belief in age are also uniquely gendered. These stereotypes sexualize girls and portray them as 
older and thus as sexually available to men.  
  
II. The Mistake of Age Defence 
In 1987, Parliament revised its structure of sexual offences against children and enacted a 
number of new offences such as sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching.19 In these 
prosecutions, age is substituted for non-consent; once the Crown proves the young age of the 
complainant, it need not prove non-consent in order to obtain a conviction.20 Prior to this new 
regime, a defence that an accused was mistaken about the complainant’s age was expressly 
prohibited by the Criminal Code.21 The 1987 reforms included a new limited defence of mistaken 
belief in age in s. 150.1(4) to respond to criticisms that the previous offence was effectively one 
of absolute liability and thus risked being invalidated under s. 7 of the Charter.22   
The mistaken belief in age defence enacted in s. 150.1(4) allows an accused to raise a 
mistaken belief that the complainant was at or above the age of consent, but the defence will only 
be successful where the accused has taken “all reasonable steps” to ascertain the complainant’s 
 
19 See An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act, SC 1987, c 24; Criminal Code, RSC 1985, 
c C-46, ss 151, 152 [Code].  
20 See Code, supra note 19, s 150.1(1).   
21 See Criminal Code, RSC 1970, c C-34, s 146 (1).  
22 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. See e.g. R v Hess, [1990] 2 SCR 906, 59 CCC (3d) 161; Reference Re BC Motor 
Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486, 24 DLR (4th) 536.  
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age. This provision was modelled on the reasonable steps provision for consent for sexual offences 
against adults,23 but there were some crucial differences. First, the reasonable steps provision 
dealing with consent in the context of adult complainants only requires the accused to take 
reasonable steps and not all reasonable steps. Second, the reasonable steps provision dealing with 
consent only requires the accused to take reasonable steps “in the circumstances known to the 
accused at the time”.24 Parliament clearly made the decision that a more stringent standard was 
warranted for child victims of sexual offences.   
The purpose of the “all reasonable steps” requirement was to prevent adults from asserting 
that they were mistaken about the complainant’s age where they had failed to do everything 
reasonably possible to avoid having sex with a child. The common law had allowed men to rely 
on mistaken beliefs in consent that were unreasonable so long as they were honestly held – which 
was precisely why Parliament enacted reasonable steps provisions.25 Section 150.1(4), like other 
reasonable steps provisions, modifies that common law position.   
There are a number of reasonable steps provisions with respect to age in the Criminal Code 
that have been enacted since 1987, most of which require the accused to take “all reasonable steps” 
while others simply require “reasonable steps”.26 In 2008, Parliament raised the age of consent for 
most sexual offences against children from 14 years of age to 16, but the age may be as high as 18 
for certain offences27 and as low as 12 where the accused is close in age to the complainant.28 A 
 
23 See Code, supra note 19, s 273.2(b). 
24 Ibid. 
25 See Pappajohn v The Queen, [1980] 2 SCR 120 at 156, 111 DLR (3d) 1. See also An Act to Amend the Criminal 
Code (Sexual Assault), SC 1992, c 38.  
26 See e.g. Code, supra note 19, ss 150.1(4), (5), (6), 163.1(5) (requiring “all reasonable steps”), and ss 171.1(4), 
172.1(4), 172.2(4) (requiring only “reasonable steps”).  
27 See ibid, ss 153(2) (sexual exploitation), 163.1(1) (child pornography). Obtaining sexual services for 
consideration is subject to a higher penalty where sexual services are obtained from someone below the age of 18. 
See ibid, s 286.1(2).  
28 See ibid, s 150.1(2).  
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large majority of the reported decisions involve adolescent girl complainants between the ages of 
12 and 15, but there are at least five reported cases since 2000 involving girls as young as 11,29 
and one luring and child pornography case involving a 9-year-old girl where mistaken belief in 
age was raised.30 
Courts have consistently interpreted reasonable steps provisions regarding age and consent 
as putting no burden of proof on the accused.31 Rather, once the accused raises an air of reality that 
he was mistaken and that he had taken “all reasonable steps” to ascertain age, the burden of proof 
remains on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did not take all 
reasonable steps.32 Once the Crown has met that stringent burden, the accused is precluded from 
arguing that he had a mistaken belief.33 In other words,  the reasonable steps requirement puts a 
limit on when an accused could raise the defence of mistaken belief in age. The decision of the 
 
29 See Hope, supra note 16; Lefthand, supra note 16; Normand, supra note 16; John, supra note 16; ET, supra note 
16. The youngest male complainants in cases involving the mistaken belief in age defence in this time period were 
both 13 years of age. See Crant, supra note 16; TSH, supra note 16. The law is unclear as to whether an accused can 
argue mistaken belief to bring a complainant within the close in age exceptions rather than the age of consent. For 
example, can an 18-year-old male argue he mistakenly believed he was having sex with a 15-year-old (to bring him 
within the close in age exceptions) when in fact the complainant was 12? See Isabel Grant & Janine Benedet, 
“Confronting the Sexual Assault of Teenage Girls: The Mistake of Age Defence in Canadian Sexual Assault Law” 
(2019) 97:1 Can Bar Rev 1 at 14–15 [Grant & Benedet, “Mistake of Age”].  
30 See Otokiti, supra note 15, where the female accused argued mistaken belief in age about a nine-year-old girl who 
was lured online.. 
31 See e.g. R v Westman, [1995] BCJ No 2124 at para 20, 28 WCB (2d) 440 (CA) [Westman]; R v Osborne (1992), 
102 Nfld & PEIR 194 at paras 44–47, 17 WCB (2d) 581 (CA) [Osborne].  
32 There was some lack of clarity as to whether the air of reality threshold applied only to the mistaken belief or 
whether it applied to having taken reasonable steps as well. It was settled in R c Gagnon, 2018 CMAC 1 at para 28, 
aff’d 2018 SCC 41 [Gagnon (CMAC)] that it applies to both. It is noteworthy that the accused must point to an air 
of reality for many defences, including some that go to mens rea, such as the intoxication defence. See R v Cinous, 
2002 SCC 29 at para 57. 
33 See e.g. R v Morrison, 2017 ONCA 582 at para 95 [Morrison (CA)]; R v Levigne, 2010 SCC 25 at para 36 
[Levigne]. Justice Abella, who would have struck down the reasonable steps test in Morrison (SCC), supra note 6, 
agreed with the interpretation of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that once the Crown has met its burden of 
disproving reasonable steps beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused is precluded from raising the defence of 
mistaken belief in age. See Morrison (SCC), supra note 6 at para 207. See also Hamish Stewart, “Fault and 
‘Reasonable Steps’: The Troubling Implications of Morrison and Barton” (2019) 24:3 Can Crim L Rev 379 at 381 
(describing a reasonable steps provision as providing “an alternative route by which the Crown can prove the fault 
element of the offence”). 
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Supreme Court in Morrison, which was extended further in Carbone, has now brought this case 
law into question. 
Isabel Grant and Janine Benedet have demonstrated the degree to which courts have 
gradually whittled away at the reasonable steps requirement.34 First, the requirement that an 
accused take “all” reasonable steps has been effectively read out of s. 150.1(4), such that provisions 
requiring “all reasonable steps” are applied in the same way as those requiring only “reasonable 
steps”.35 Second, courts have read into s. 150.1(4) the requirement from the provision dealing with 
consent that an accused must only take reasonable steps in the circumstances that are known to 
him at the time,36 despite the fact that Parliament clearly made a decision not to limit reasonable 
steps regarding age in this way. Third, as Grant and Benedet have demonstrated, some courts have 
held that the surrounding circumstances may require the accused to do absolutely nothing in order 
to satisfy having taken “all reasonable steps”.37 Sometimes, how the complainant looks or behaves 
is sufficient to obviate the need to take any steps at all, let alone “all reasonable steps”.38 These 
cases sometimes involve men whose mistakes are based on stereotyped beliefs about the sexual 
availability of girls who look or behave in certain ways rather than on actual knowledge of the 
complainant’s age. A finding that these men have to do nothing to ascertain age legitimizes these 
stereotypes and acquits men on the basis of them. Together these developments in statutory 
interpretation have undermined Parliament’s clear language and its intent to protect child victims 
from sexual activity with adults. All of this has been done without resort to the Charter. Thus, the 
 
34 See generally Grant & Benedet, “Mistake of Age”, supra note 29.  
35 See Angel, supra note 16 at para 46.  
36 See e.g. Morrison (SCC), supra note 6 at para 105; R v Thain, 2009 ONCA 223 at para 37 [Thain]; Dragos, supra 
note 16 at paras 35–41; R v Ghotra, 2016 ONSC 1324 at paras 153–54; R v Pengelley, 2010 ONSC 5488 at paras 8–
17 [Pengelley]; R v E, supra note 16 at paras 32, 96–97; Tannas, supra note 16 at paras 22, 25, 28. 
37 See Grant & Benedet, “Mistake of Age”, supra note 29 at 23–31.  
38 See e.g. Tannas, supra note 16 at paras 27, 34–35; R v LTP, [1997] BCJ No 24 at para 20, 33 WCB (2d) 292 [R v 
LTP]; R v Mastel, 2010 SKPC 66 at paras 28–30 [Mastel (SKPC)].  
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“all reasonable steps” requirement in s. 150.1(4) had already been substantially weakened by the 
time of Carbone. 
There is one final point worth making about the mistake of age defence. The mistake of 
age defence is only relevant where the complainant has agreed to participate in sexual activity with 
the accused. If the complainant did not agree to participate in sexual activity, it does not matter 
what belief the accused had about her age – that is sexual assault. However, in many of the reported 
cases, the complainant testified that such agreement was not given, and the accused testified that 
the complainant did agree to engage in sexual activity and that he thought she was above the age 
of consent. In 44 of the 117 reported cases (38%) involving a defence of mistaken belief, the 
complainant testified to a lack of agreement to participate in sex.39 In more than one-third of the 
cases in which the defence of mistaken belief was ultimately successful, the complainant testified 
that no such agreement was present.40 The mistake of age defence thus has the potential to shift 
the judicial narrative in these cases. It no longer becomes a question of has the Crown proven that 
the child did not agree to participate in sexual activity but rather, assuming she agreed to participate 
in sex, has the Crown negated that the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain age. The 
complainant’s allegations of non-consent may disappear from the case entirely.41 
Before turning to the details of Carbone, it is necessary to briefly review the decision in 
Morrison – a 2019 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada which created the potential to further 
undermine reasonable steps provisions. Without Morrison, a decision scholars and courts have 
 
39 This figure was slightly higher in cases involving female complainants (38%) than in cases involving male 
complainants (30%). 
40 This was the case in 14 of the 37 cases in which the defence was successful, 12 involving girls as complainants 
and two involving boys. 
41 See e.g. Holloway, supra note 16 at paras 12–14 (discussing the trial judge’s failure to adequately consider 
whether there had been “consent” on the part of the complainant). The Court noted, at para 15, that “[a] finding that 
the sexual conduct was not ‘forced’ was not enough to determine whether, apart from the question of the 
complainant’s age, there was a potentially operative consent.” 
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struggled to interpret, this issue would not have been considered in Carbone after years of clarity 
about how reasonable steps provisions operate.42  
III. The Impact of R v Morrison 
 
At issue in Morrison were the evidentiary presumption and the reasonable steps provision 
associated with the crime of Internet luring of children in s. 172.1(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code, 
respectively. Internet luring in s. 172.1(1) is an unusual crime because it can be committed in two 
distinct ways, both defined by the same subsection of the Criminal Code. An accused can be 
convicted for luring an actual child online or for luring someone the accused believes to be a child, 
which usually arises in the context of an undercover police officer pretending to be a child. 
Morrison itself involved a police sting operation in which the 67-year-old accused was charged 
with luring an undercover police officer who was holding herself out as a 14-year-old girl. The 
luring jurisprudence lacked clarity on the fact that the Criminal Code set out different elements for 
the two different ways in which the crime could be committed.43 Where the accused lures someone 
who is falsely holding herself out to be a child, the legislation requires that the accused “believe” 
he is communicating with a child. No such requirement of belief is set out in the legislation where 
the accused is luring an actual child, and principles of statutory interpretation would normally 
allow recklessness as sufficient mens rea in this situation.44  
 
42 See e.g. Isabel Grant & Janine Benedet, “Unreasonable Steps: Trying to Make Sense of R v Morrison” (2019) 67 
Crim LQ 14 [Grant & Benedet, “Unreasonable Steps”]; Stewart, supra note 33; Don Stuart, “R v Carbone”, Case 
Comment, (2020) 64 CR (7th) 1. Professor Stuart describes Morrison as a “lengthy, complex and perplexing” 
decision and urges the Supreme Court to reconsider its decision. He describes both Morrison and Carbone as “hard 
to follow or accept”. See also Angel, supra note 16; Carbone, supra note 5. 
43 See R v Legare, 2009 SCC 56; Levigne, supra note 33. 
44 See Regina v Buzzanga and Durocher, 25 OR (2d) 705, 101 DLR (3d) 488 (Ont CA); R v Sault Ste Marie (City), 
[1978] 2 SCR 1299, 40 CCC (2d) 353.  
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The reasonable steps provision in s. 172.1(4), the wording of which mirrors other 
reasonable steps provisions, does not acknowledge that this crime can be committed in different 
ways. There are differences between a man who asserts he wrongly believed he was talking to an 
adult (when he was in fact talking to a child), and a man who asserts he believed he was talking to 
an adult, and was in fact doing so, albeit an adult who was pretending to be a child. In the latter 
scenario, the provision is effectively requiring the accused to take reasonable steps to confirm that 
he is in fact talking to an adult before he can say he disbelieved a representation that he was 
engaging with a child. The mandatory evidentiary presumption in s. 172.1(3) complicated this 
analysis by presuming, where the person represented themselves as a child, that the accused 
believed he was talking to a child. In other words, in virtually every case involving an undercover 
officer, the accused was deemed to believe that he was communicating with a child unless he could 
raise evidence to the contrary, even though he was in fact communicating with an adult. In some 
cases, that evidence to the contrary was an accused arguing that he was role-playing, or that he 
believed he was talking to an adult who was pretending to be a child, for the purposes of sexual 
gratification.45 The luring provisions were added to the Criminal Code in 2002,46 and it appears 
that no thought was given to how the reasonable steps provision would actually work where the 
accused correctly believed he was talking to an adult. 
The Supreme Court in Morrison was unanimous in striking down the evidentiary burden 
as contrary to s. 11(d) of the Charter and not saved by s. 1. The dissenting judgment of Justice 
Abella would have also struck down the reasonable steps provision under s. 7 of the Charter. 
However, Justice Abella was clear on how reasonable steps provisions work generally and on the 
 
45 See e.g. Morrison (SCC), supra note 6 at para 24.  
46 See Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2001, SC 2002, c 13, s 8. 
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fact that once the Crown had negated reasonable steps beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused 
cannot assert an honest but mistaken belief. Justice Abella would have invalidated the provision 
as violating an accused’s right to full answer and defence because, in her view, it is almost 
impossible to ascertain identity on the Internet, let alone age, given the anonymous nature of online 
communications and the potential for deception. Further, according to Justice Abella, an accused 
who takes steps to ascertain age by, for example, asking the complainant for a photograph enhances 
his risk of being charged with luring because those very steps could be evidence of luring.47 The 
approach of Justice Abella failed to recognize that talking to children online is only criminalized 
under s. 172.1 where it is done for the purpose of facilitating the commission of (almost always) a 
further sexual offence.48 Merely talking to a child online about sex, where the accused has no 
purpose to facilitate a further offence, is not criminalized as Internet luring under s. 172.1. A man 
who is unable to ascertain the age of the person with whom he is speaking can simply desist from 
pursuing any further sexual purpose until he has a more meaningful opportunity to ascertain age.49  
It is the judgment of Justice Moldaver for the majority that has led to considerable problems 
for other reasonable steps provisions. The majority avoided striking down the reasonable steps 
provision in s. 172.1(4) by effectively interpreting it out of existence for the crime of Internet 
luring. The majority held that, even where the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the accused had not taken reasonable steps, the Crown would still have to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused believed he was talking to a child.50  This reasoning was largely 
 
47 See Morrison (SCC), supra note 6 at paras 220–23. 
48 Abduction of a person under the age of 14 is also included as one of the further offences in s. 172.1. See Code, 
supra note 19, s 172.1.  
49 See Grant & Benedet, “Mistake of Age”, supra note 29 at 31–35.  
50 See Morrison (SCC), supra note 6 at paras 82–83. 
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driven by the requirement in s. 172.1(1) that, where the accused was not talking to an actual child, 
he must have believed he was talking to a child.  
The majority repeatedly limited its analysis to the sting operation context where the 
accused’s belief is an element of the offence.51 It did so precisely because, in the police sting 
context, there is no actual child being harmed and the accused’s moral blameworthiness lies in his 
belief that he is talking to a child.52  For other sexual offences against actual children, recklessness 
is sufficient mens rea.53 The sting context is unique because without a belief that he is talking to a 
child, the accused has done nothing wrong, at least if one assumes there is nothing wrong in role-
playing the sexual abuse of children.54  
Morrison rendered the reasonable steps provision for Internet luring meaningless. Grant 
and Benedet have argued that the decision leaves no room for the reasonable steps requirement to 
have any impact on the verdict:  
If the trier of fact does not have a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the 
complainant was underage, he will be convicted. If the trier of fact has a reasonable 
doubt about the accused’s belief, the accused is acquitted even though he did not 
take reasonable steps. Reasonable steps are irrelevant to the verdict, which depends 
entirely on whether the Crown can prove the accused believed he was talking to an 
underage child.55  
 
The Morrison majority went out of its way to limit its judgment to Internet luring in the 
context of a police sting operation. The Court of Appeal for Ontario, therefore, had a choice in 
Carbone about whether to accept the majority at its word that Morrison was limited to the sting 
 
51 See Morrison (SCC), supra note 6 at paras 49, 55, 81, 84–85, 95, 101.  
52 See ibid at paras 13, 49, 55. See also Morrison (CA), supra note 33 at para 101.   
53 See Westman, supra note 31 at paras 18–19; Kim, supra note 16 at paras 78–88; Nguyen, supra note 16 at para 14.  
54 Grant and Benedet have argued that it is not harmless for men to condition a sexual response to the abuse of 
children. See Grant & Benedet, “Unreasonable Steps”, supra note 42 at 25.  
55 Ibid at 28 [footnotes omitted].   
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context or to undermine the “all reasonable steps” requirement in other Criminal Code provisions 
dealing with mistakes about age. It is to the decision in Carbone that this article now turns. 
IV. The Decision in R v Carbone 
 
A. Background 
The accused in Carbone was convicted at trial of invitation to sexual touching. The 
evidence presented by the Crown was that three 14-year-old girls reached out to the accused on 
Facebook asking him if he would give them tattoos in exchange for sex. They negotiated that one 
of the girls would give him “a blow job” before he did the tattooing and another would have 
intercourse with him after he finished the tattoos.56 The complainant, HJ, testified that soon after 
she arrived at the accused’s home, she went upstairs with Carbone, performed oral sex on him, and 
then each of the girls was given a tattoo. HJ testified that when she was performing oral sex, she 
saw that the accused had a tattoo on his penis. While the accused did spend some time alone with 
HJ’s friend KM afterwards, KM refused to testify and thus there was no evidence about what 
happened after the tattooing. Later that evening, HJ received a Facebook message from someone 
she assumed to be the accused saying, “H. that was amazing. Best I ever had. Gold medal.”57 HJ 
also testified that the accused did not ask her how old she was, nor whether she had permission 
from her parents to get a tattoo. Another girl, AG, confirmed much of HJ’s testimony and added 
that HJ had told the accused the true ages of the girls, although that was not part of HJ’s testimony.  
The 31-year-old accused also testified. He operated a licensed tattoo parlour out of his 
home where he lived with his fiancée.58 He testified that the girls had approached him to exchange 
 
56 See Carbone, supra note 5 at para 6.  
57 Ibid at para 11.  
58 See ibid at para 16. 
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sex for tattoos, but that he had told them each tattoo would cost $35 and that he had staunchly 
rejected their offers.59 He testified that he was never alone with any of the girls and that his fiancée 
came home after he had tattooed the first two girls, a fact which the girls denied. When he 
demanded money from the girls, they told him their mother would come by later and pay him. 
When the mother did not appear, the accused testified that he called HJ and told her that if she did 
not pay him, he would contact her parents and go to the police.60 He testified that HJ assured him 
that she would pay him by Friday. On Friday morning, the police arrived at Carbone’s home and 
arrested him. He testified that he initially thought he was being arrested for tattooing underage 
girls.61 While the girls testified that he did not ask their age, he testified that they  told him on 
Facebook they were 16 and that he had seen a permission slip signed by somebody he assumed to 
be a parent, although he could not produce it.62 He admitted that he did think it was strange that 
three girls the same age would have the same mother, but he did not ask any questions about this.63 
He testified that he was not able to produce any of the Facebook messages “because his fiancée 
had destroyed them after he was arrested.”64  
After his fiancée testified to corroborate his account, the defence recalled the accused at 
which point he mentioned for the first time that he had told the girls that he had a tattoo “on his 
‘crotch’” because one of the girls was worried the tattoo was going to hurt. He said he wanted to 
reassure her that where she was getting tattooed would be less painful than the one on his crotch 
had been.65  
 
59 See ibid at paras 17–18. 
60 See ibid at para 22. 
61 See ibid. 
62 See ibid at paras 21, 23–24. 
63 See ibid at para 21. 
64 Ibid at para 18. 
65 Ibid at paras 25–26. 
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The trial judge convicted the accused. The judge believed beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the accused had agreed to give the complainant a tattoo in exchange for oral sex, that the 
complainant had performed oral sex on him, and that the accused had not taken the requisite “all 
reasonable steps” to assert a defence of mistaken belief in age.66  
The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial primarily on the basis that the trial judge had made 
a number of errors regarding burden of proof. The trial judge stated that he was “not convinced” 
by the accused’s testimony that a financial arrangement was made for the tattoos;67 “not 
persuaded” that the Facebook message received by HJ after the events was not sent by the 
accused;68 “not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt” that the accused saw a permission slip;69 and 
“not persuaded” by the fiancée’s testimony that he had not negotiated to exchange tattoos for sex.70 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the occasional mistake on burden of proof has to be seen 
in the context of the correct instructions earlier in the judge’s reasons, but decided that it had to 
allow the appeal because the facts to which these mistakes related were central to the accused’s 
defence and contrary to the requirements of R v W(D)71 regarding burden of proof and credibility. 
The Court of Appeal could have left the matter there and allowed a new trial on burden of proof 
errors alone, but it decided to go on and clarify the impact of Morrison on the reasonable steps 
provision in s.150.1(4).72 
 
66 See ibid at para 29.  
67 Ibid at para 31. 
68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid.  
71 [1991] 1 SCR 742, [1991] SCJ No 26. 
72 The Court rejected the arguments related to a s. 11(b) trial within a reasonable time and clarified that the crime of 
invitation to sexual touching does not require that the accused initiated the communication or activity, but rather that 
he said something that amounted to an invitation. The Court agreed that the trial judge wrongly implied that the 
Crown had to prove that oral sex happened, but that this error did not disadvantage the accused. See Carbone, supra 
note 5 at paras 58, 61–63. 
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B. The “All Reasonable Steps” Issue  
The trial judge in Carbone, prior to the decision in Morrison, convicted the accused 
because the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had not taken all 
reasonable steps to inquire into the complainant’s age as was the law at that time. This has been 
the approach taken by appellate courts across the country for years,73 and the Supreme Court of 
Canada had confirmed this approach in R v George.74 Once Morrison was released, however, the 
defence in Carbone argued on appeal for the first time that the reasoning in Morrison should be 
extended to invitation to sexual touching such that, even where the Crown has proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused failed to take “all reasonable steps” to ascertain the age of the 
complainant, the Crown must go on to prove that the accused knew or was wilfully blind to the 
complainant’s young age.  
The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown that the context of Internet luring could be 
distinguished from invitation to sexual touching. The statutory provisions dealing with Internet 
luring must be able to address the unique challenges of dealing with those who use the Internet to 
exploit children and to facilitate police intervention before further sexual offences have taken 
place. The luring legislation allows police to intervene not only based on an underage complainant 
but also based on the accused’s belief about the complainant’s age, thus allowing for sting 
operations to identify predators before they lure actual children. Because there is no harm to an 
actual child in the sting context, a “stringent subjective standard” of mens rea is required.75 The 
mistake of age defence and the corresponding “all reasonable steps” provision for sexual offences 
against actual children require a less stringent mens rea requirement. The Court of Appeal did 
 
73 See e.g. Duran, supra note 16 at para 51; Saliba (2013), supra note 16 at paras 26–28; Tannas, supra note 16 at 
paras 21–24; Nguyen, supra note 16 at para 4.  
74 See George (SCC), supra note 15 at para 8.  
75 Carbone, supra note 5 at para 100. 
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acknowledge that the reasonable steps provision has no role left to play in the context of Internet 
luring,76 but it explicitly held that this analysis could not be extended to reasonable steps provisions 
for other offences against actual children.  
However, the Court of Appeal accomplished exactly the same result by returning to the 
Morrison majority’s brief discussion of the decision in George and concluding that the Crown now 
has a new additional mens rea requirement before an accused can be convicted. The unanimous 
Supreme Court of Canada judgment in George77 had confirmed that the reasonable steps 
requirement modifies the mens rea requirement for the crime of sexual interference. In other 
words, an honest belief that the complainant was above the age of consent is only a defence where 
the accused has taken all reasonable steps. Once the Crown disproves beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the accused took all reasonable steps, there is no room for an accused to assert an honest 
mistaken belief in age.  
Ms. George was acquitted of sexual interference  at trial on the basis that a trial judge had 
a reasonable doubt that she had taken “all reasonable steps” to ascertain age before having sex 
with an underage male friend of her son.78 The Court of Appeal overturned that acquittal on the 
basis that information the accused gained while having sex with the complainant could not 
constitute reasonable steps and that the trial judge had drawn improper inferences about the 
appearance of the complainant.79 The Supreme Court of Canada reinstated the acquittal on the 
basis that the Court of Appeal should not have interfered with the trial judge’s assessment of the 
evidence. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the widely held understanding of 
 
76 See ibid at para 91. 
77 Supra note 15.  
78 See R v George, 2016 SKCA 155 at para 19.  
79 See ibid at paras 41–46, cited in George (SCC), supra note 15 at para 12. 
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the reasonable steps provisions requiring the Crown either to negate the mistaken belief or to 
negate the all reasonable steps requirement: 
[T]o convict an accused person who demonstrates an “air of reality” to the 
mistake of age defence, the Crown must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
either that the accused person (1) did not honestly believe the complainant 
was at least 16 (the subjective element ); or (2) did not take “all reasonable 
steps” to ascertain the complainant’s age (the objective element) [...]. 80  
[and] 
It is a criminal offence to sexually touch a child who is 14 years of age or 
more but younger than 16 when you are five or more years their senior, 
even if you honestly believe they are older than 16, unless you have taken 
“all reasonable steps” to ascertain their age; nothing more is required 
[...].81 
George is unequivocal on how the “all reasonable steps” provision limits the defence of 
mistaken belief. However, there were two paragraphs about George in Morrison – which were 
completely unnecessary for a decision on Internet luring in the sting context – that bring this 
finding in George into doubt. The majority in Morrison effectively rewrote George by saying that 
even where the Crown has disproven all reasonable steps to ascertain age beyond a reasonable 
doubt, a conviction is not inevitable because the Crown would still have to prove George knew the 
complainant’s age. Here is that confusing passage from Morrison in full: 
Given that the complainant was legally incapable of consenting, 
Ms. George’s sole defence was that she believed, albeit mistakenly, that 
the 14-year-old complainant was at least 16 years old. In those 
circumstances, if the trier of fact were to find or have a reasonable doubt 
that Ms. George honestly believed the complainant was at least 16, she 
would be entitled to an acquittal. Put differently, if the Crown hoped to 
obtain a conviction, it had to overcome her defence of mistaken belief. 
Against this backdrop, the passage in question at para. 8 
of George explains that there were two alternate ways by which the Crown 
could negate the defence of mistaken belief in age once the air of reality 
test had been met. First, the Crown could prove that the accused did not 
 
80 George (SCC), supra note 15 at para 8 [footnotes omitted; emphasis added].  
81 Ibid at para 26 [footnotes omitted]. 
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honestly believe the complainant was at least 16; or, second, the Crown 
could prove that the accused did not take “all reasonable steps” to ascertain 
the complainant’s age. While the Crown had to prove at least one of these 
propositions to negate the defence of mistaken belief, doing so would not, 
from a legal perspective, inevitably lead to a conviction. As a legal matter, 
to obtain a conviction for sexual interference or sexual assault of a person 
under the age of 16, the Crown had to go further and prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused believed the complainant was under 16. 
As a practical matter, once Ms. George’s sole defence was negated, her 
conviction was a virtual certainty.82 
 
With the  emphasized part of this passage, the Morrison majority risked undermining all 
of the Criminal Code’s reasonable steps provisions regarding age. It did not indicate that it was 
overruling the unanimous decision in George or even that George had misstated the law. Ought 
we to take this passage as the Morrison majority implicitly undoing years of appellate 
jurisprudence, including its own clear language in George, on reasonable steps provisions in the 
context of mistaken beliefs in age? This is precisely what the Court of Appeal for Ontario 
concluded in Carbone, holding that the Crown disproving all reasonable steps is no longer 
sufficient to negate a mistaken belief in age defence:   
As I read the above-quoted passage, it is no longer, strictly speaking, correct to 
define the required mens rea with respect to the complainant’s age by reference, 
only to the absence of reasonable steps to determine the complainant’s age. There 
is a mens rea requirement that focuses exclusively on the accused’s state of mind. 
The Crown is required to prove the accused believe the complainant was underage. 
The requisite proof is not provided by the Crown’s negation of the defence created 
by s. 150.1(4).83 
 
Unlike the passage quoted from Morrison which speaks only of actual belief, the Court in 
Carbone did concede that recklessness about the complainant’s age will be a sufficient mental 
 
82 Morrison (SCC), supra note 6 at paras 87–88 [emphasis added].  
83 Carbone, supra note 5 at para 120.  
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state under these offences. But the fact remains that the requirement that the accused take “all 
reasonable steps” has no impact on the verdict. If the accused raises an air of reality that he was 
mistaken about the complainant’s age and that he took all reasonable steps, the Crown must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not take all reasonable steps, but doing so does not result in 
conviction. The Crown must go on and prove a subjective fault requirement beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Rather than a path to conviction, the reasonable steps provision is transformed into one 
more hurdle for the Crown. If the Crown is unable to disprove reasonable steps beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the accused is acquitted. If the Crown is able to disprove reasonable steps beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the inquiry moves on to did the accused know, or was he willfully blind or 
reckless as to the age of the complainant before obtaining a conviction.  
The Court of Appeal did recognize that it had opened the door to acquittals for those who 
never bother to think about age but go ahead and engage in sexual activity with a child regardless. 
What follows looks a bit like a new description of recklessness, referred to as “reckless 
indifference”, to deal with those who simply do not think about age. The Court described reckless 
indifference as follows: 
An accused who never turns his mind to the complainant’s age can properly be 
described as reckless with respect to the complainant’s age in most circumstances. 
Indifference to the age of the person targeted by sexual activity is a choice by an 
accused to treat the complainant’s age as irrelevant to his decision to engage in the 
sexual activity. In most circumstances, the age of the young person will have 
obvious relevance, bearing in mind the clear responsibility which the law places 
upon adults who choose to engage in sexual activity with young persons: […] 
Reckless indifference describes a subjective state of mind. It reflects a choice to 
treat age as irrelevant and to assume the risk associated with that choice. While this 
may describe a relatively low level of recklessness, there is nothing in the nature of 
the conduct engaged in which would warrant any level of risk taking or preclude 
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the imposition of criminal liability based on a reckless indifference to the 
complainant’s age: […]84 
 
However, even this definition of “reckless indifference” requires a choice to treat age as 
irrelevant and a subjective awareness of the risk. The person who simply does not think about age 
is not reckless. The Court also acknowledged that usually the failure to take reasonable steps will 
make it difficult for the accused to claim that he believed the complainant was of the required age. 
There will be “few situations in which a person who engages in sexual activity with an underaged 
person and does not take reasonable steps to determine the age of that person, will not be found to 
have been at least reckless as to the true age of the complainant.”85 The Court acknowledged that 
it had complicated the job of trial judges and juries for these crimes. It set out the following steps 
to follow. If these instructions appear complicated, imagine explaining steps two and three to a 
jury: 
Step 1: The trial judge will first determine whether there is an air of reality to the s. 
150.1(4) defence, that is, is there a basis in the evidence to support the claim the 
accused believed the complainant was the required age and took all reasonable steps 
to determine the complainant’s age. 
Step 2: If the answer to step 1 is no, the s. 150.1(4) defence is not in play, and any 
claim the accused believed the complainant was the required age is removed from 
the evidentiary mix. If the answer at step 1 is yes, the trial judge will decide whether 
the Crown has negated the defence by proving beyond a reasonable doubt, either 
that the accused did not believe the complainant was the required age, or did not 
take all reasonable steps to determine her age. If the Crown fails to negate the 
defence, the accused will be acquitted. If the Crown negates the defence, the judge 
will go on to step 3.  
Step 3: The trial judge will consider, having determined there is no basis for the 
claim the accused believed the complainant was the required age, whether the 
Crown has proved the accused believed (or was wilfully blind) the complainant was 
underage, or was reckless as to her underage status. If the answer is yes, the trial 
judge will convict. If the answer is no, the trial judge will acquit. 86 
 
84 Ibid at paras 126–27 [footnotes omitted; emphasis added].  
85 Ibid at para 130. 
86 Ibid at para 129.  
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The first step is clear and relates to the judge’s role in determining whether the defence has 
met the air of reality threshold to point to some evidence that the accused was mistaken about the 
complainant’s age and that he took all reasonable steps to ascertain it. The second step addresses 
whether the Crown is able to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt either the mistaken belief or the 
“all reasonable steps”. Where things get complicated is step 3. Even if the Crown proves beyond 
a reasonable doubt either that the accused was not mistaken or that he did not take all reasonable 
steps to ascertain age, the Crown in Ontario now has an additional burden to prove that the accused 
knew that the complainant was under the age of consent or was wilfully blind or reckless with 
respect to that fact. There is no mention of “reckless indifference” in this third step, thus suggesting 
that it is simply synonymous with recklessness and that the Court was not attempting to develop 
some new modified form of recklessness.  
The Court was explicit that it is the two paragraphs from Morrison about George, 
unnecessary for the decision in Morrison, that have undermined constitutionally valid criminal 
legislation: 
The treatment of George by the majority in Morrison makes it clear that the Crown 
cannot prove the requisite mens rea for offences set out in s. 150.1(4) by disproving 
the defence created by that section. To convict, the Crown must prove the accused 
had the requisite state of mind with respect to the complainant’s underage status.87  
 
Again, the Court reiterated that there will be “few situations”88 where the accused will be able to 
raise such a reasonable doubt about his knowledge/recklessness that the girl was underage. 
 
While one can imagine circumstances in which the failure to advert to the age of 
the complainant should not be characterized as a decision to treat the age of the 
complainant as irrelevant and take the risk, those circumstances will seldom occur 
 
87 Ibid at para 128. 
88 Ibid at para 130. 
 25 
in the real world. For practical purposes, those rare circumstances, in which the 
failure to turn one’s mind to the age of the complainant does not reflect the decision 
to take a risk about the complainant’s age, will be the same rare circumstances in 
which the reasonable steps inquiry in s. 150.1(4) will be satisfied even though the 
accused took no active steps to determine the complainant’s age.89  
 
As will be discussed in more detail below, the Court acknowledged in this passage that, 
unsurprisingly, the cases where this new additional mens rea requirement will be most likely to 
lead to acquittal will be those where courts have already done the most to undermine the “all 
reasonable steps” requirement in the past, holding that the accused need do nothing to satisfy taking 
“all reasonable steps”.90 In other words, acquittals will be most likely the accused has made 
assumptions about a child’s age based on what she looks like, how she behaves, or the 
circumstances in which he finds her without having done anything to ascertain age.  
(C) Analysis  
Carbone effectively renders the “all reasonable steps” provision in s. 150.1(4) irrelevant to 
whether an accused is convicted in Ontario. Instead, it makes the “all reasonable steps” 
requirement an additional hurdle for the Crown to negate to avoid an acquittal, even though doing 
so will not lead to conviction. An accused can no longer be convicted on the basis that he failed to 
take all reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the complainant. Instead, for the accused who did 
nothing to ascertain a child’s age, the Crown must prove at least recklessness with respect to the 
fact that the complainant was underage.  
While the approach in Carbone could be said to logically flow from the obscure passage 
about George in Morrison, it was not the only possible interpretation. The Court of Appeal for 
 
89 Ibid at para 131.  
90 For sources and further discussion of this topic, see n 104 and accompanying text. 
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British Columbia took a different path in Angel91 when it declined to apply Morrison to the crime 
of sexual interference against an actual child. The Court in Angel correctly highlighted the fact that 
the majority in Morrison limited its judgment to the context of a police sting operation where an 
actual belief about age is required by the legislation. Sexual interference, by contrast, always 
involves an actual child, and knowledge is not required: 
In the context of a police sting operation where there is no child who is under the 
legal age, as in Morrison, the offence depends on the accused’s belief that he is 
communicating with an underage person. In contrast, the offence[sexual 
interference] in s. 151 does not engage the accused’s belief as to the complainant’s 
age as an element of the offence in the absence of the mistake of age defence being 
raised.92  
 
The Court in Angel differentiated Morrison as follows. The problem in Morrison was that 
the elements of the defence of mistake did not line up with the elements of the crime of Internet 
luring. The defence was founded on the Crown negating an objective test, whereas the offence 
explicitly required an actual belief. Therefore, disproving the defence was not sufficient to prove 
the offence. In sexual interference, by contrast, recklessness is sufficient and therefore disproving 
the defence will inevitably lead to conviction.93 However, most importantly, the Court in Angel 
acknowledged that the all reasonable steps requirement “imports an objective element”94 into the 
recklessness analysis for sexual interference. Thus, while the Court of Appeal is equating the “all 
reasonable steps” test with recklessness, it is recklessness modified by an objective component 
that is mandated by the all reasonable steps requirement in s. 150.1(4):  
The judge was required to consider the all reasonable steps requirement to 
determine the availability of the defence. By doing so in this context, he was also 
assessing whether the Crown had satisfied its burden of proving the requisite mens 
 
91 Supra note 16.   
92 Ibid at para 31 [emphasis in original].  
93 See ibid at para 45.  
94 Ibid at para 48. 
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rea of the offence—i.e., that the appellant’s subjective belief was not objectively 
reasonable, and was therefore reckless. Therefore, once the trial judge concluded 
that the appellant had failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain the 
complainant’s age, there was no need to explicitly revisit the essential elements of 
the offence. At that point, the judge was satisfied that the Crown had met its burden 
of proving that the mistake of age defence did not apply. At the same time, the 
culpable fault element for sexual interference was established: the appellant 
intended to touch the complainant for a sexual purpose and was recklessly 
indifferent as to his age.95 
 
This approach makes more sense where one reads in the requirement that the accused must only 
take steps in the circumstances known to the accused at the time, which the Court in Angel appears 
to do, because that adds the necessary subjectivity into the test.96 
The Court in Angel made explicit that it was concerned about the possibility of extending 
Morrison beyond the narrow context of the sting operation because it had the potential to 
undermine decades of sexual assault law reform enacted to prevent acquittals based on 
unreasonable mistaken beliefs: 
More precise reasoning by the Supreme Court of Canada than exists in Morrison is 
required before it can be extended to the interrelationship of the mens rea 
requirement and mistake of age defence, as they pertain specifically to the offence 
of sexual interference under s. 151 of the Code. This is particularly the case where, 
as noted above, Moldaver J. restricted his analysis to the context of Internet luring 
where there is no actual underage child […]97 
 
Thus, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia managed to maintain a meaningful role for s. 
150.1(4). Once the Crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not mistaken or 
did not take all reasonable steps, conviction will follow.  
 
95 Ibid at para 49. 
96 See ibid at para 58 (although the Court is not entirely clear on this point). See also Morrison (SCC), supra note 6 
at para 105 (where Moldaver J reads this requirement into the reasonable steps provision in s. 172.1(4)); Thain, 
supra note 36 at para 37; Dragos, supra note 16 at paras 32, 41; Pengelley, supra note 36 at para 9.  
97 Angel, supra note 16 at para 51 [footnotes omitted]. 
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While Angel is cited for the principle that recklessness is sufficient mens rea for sexual 
interference,98 there is no mention in Carbone of the different approach to reasonable steps in 
Angel. The objective component mandated by s. 150.1(4) disappears from the analysis. The 
Supreme Court of Canada has denied leave to appeal in Angel,99 and it is unlikely the Crown will 
seek leave to appeal in Carbone.100 Regardless, the result is that we are left with an “all 
reasonable steps” requirement for age in British Columbia but not in Ontario.  
The Court of Appeal for Ontario purported to limit its decision by imposing a minimalist 
interpretation of recklessness, stating that it will often be enough to show that the accused did 
nothing to ascertain age. But the fact remains that someone who never considers the possibility 
that he is dealing with a child is entitled to an acquittal. Recklessness is a subjective mental state 
and an honest belief, however unreasonable, that the complainant is older than 16 is inconsistent 
with a finding of recklessness unless one reads in the objective component as acknowledged by 
the Court of Appeal for British Columbia in Angel.101 Recklessness requires a subjective awareness 
of the risk; wilful blindness requires an actual suspicion that such is the case and the deliberate 
closing of one’s mind to the possibility because one does not want to know.102 The Supreme Court 
of Canada in R v Zora103 has confirmed that recklessness is a subjective standard requiring the 
accused “[perceive] a substantial and unjustified risk”.104 Further, despite its efforts, the Court of 
 
98 See Carbone, supra note 5 at para 124. 
99 See Angel, supra note 16, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 2020 CanLII 29401.  
100 As of 1 December 2020, it was not reported on the Supreme Court of Canada website or elsewhere that leave to 
appeal has been sought by the Crown. Because the trial judge’s errors on burden of proof were so clear in Carbone, 
an appeal on the reasonable steps issue would be unlikely to impact the order for a new trial.  
101 See R v Sansregret, [1985] 1 SCR 570 at 584, 1985 CanLII 79 [Sansregret] (where the Court makes clear that a 
finding of recklessness is inconsistent with a finding of honest mistaken belief).  
102 See ibid. 
103 2020 SCC 14. 
104 Ibid at para 109. 
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Appeal cannot bind future trial judges on findings of fact. A trial judge who finds that the accused 
never thought about age would be correct in rejecting a finding of recklessness. 
Parliament has decided that the failure to take “all reasonable steps” to find out how old a 
child is before engaging in sexual activity is a blameworthy mental state. If one reads in “in the 
circumstances known to the accused” as the courts have done, this mental state has a clear 
subjective component, but it also has an objective component mandated by s. 150.1(4) requiring 
that all steps that are reasonable  be taken. This approach differs from the traditional common law 
understanding of recklessness as to age because it allows for a conviction where an accused has 
done nothing to inform himself about the complainant’s age, based on his knowledge of the 
circumstances, or where he has not taken all the steps considered reasonable. Parliament is free to 
depart from the common law and has done so in s. 150.1(4). Again, no court has found this level 
of fault to be unconstitutional.105 
 
The Court in Carbone suggested that the only cases where this new mens rea requirement 
will make a difference are those where courts have already held that the accused need not take any 
steps in order to satisfy having taken “all reasonable steps.”106 These cases involve courts 
 
105 Most of the cases involving Charter challenges to this provision focus on s. 150.1(1), which removes the defence 
of consent where the complainant is under the age of consent. However, many of these cases confirm the 
constitutionality of s. 150.1 as a whole in the analysis. See e.g. Osborne, supra note 31; R v Hann, 1992 CanLII 
7133 (NL CA), 75 CCC (3d) 355; R v AB, 2015 ONCA 803. In a rare case where a s. 7 violation was found to be a 
reasonable limit under s. 1, a Quebec court also upheld s. 150.1. See Protection de la jeunesse–436, 1989 
CarswellQue 1232 (CQ (Youth Div), [1990] RJQ 1481. However, this case was decided before courts had 
determined that the reasonable steps requirement did not put a burden of proof on the accused. In Morrison (SCC), 
supra note 6 at para 215 Justice Abella makes the following comment about the constitutionality of reasonable steps 
provisions generally:  
 
I see nothing constitutionally suspect about reasonable steps requirements generally. These requirements are 
intended to “enhance protections for youth” in the mistake of age context […] and preclude reliance on 
stereotypes and assumptions in the consent context [citations omitted]. 
 
106 See Carbone, supra note 5 at para 130.   
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disregarding clear Parliamentary language to instead rely on stereotyped beliefs about the sexual 
availability of the most marginalized girls.107 Not thinking, or making assumptions about a girl’s 
age based on the size of her breasts;108 her associating with older people;109 her jogging110or 
hitchhiking at night;111 the fact she knew how to perform oral sex112 or her portrayal as the sexual 
aggressor;113 or the fact that she was drinking alcohol, taking drugs, or smoking cigarettes,114 
should never have satisfied taking “all reasonable steps”. Such stereotypes tell us nothing about a 
particular girl’s age. They operate disproportionately against girls who are already marginalized 
through their chaotic family lives,115 risk-taking behaviours,116 or previous experience with sex 
which may well have been abusive because of their young ages.117 Lacking parental supervision, 
abusing drugs or alcohol, knowledge of sex, or even breast development are not reliable indicators 
of being at or above the age of consent, nor are they steps to ascertain age. It is notable that 
Indigenous girls are disproportionately impacted by sexual assault and by racist stereotypes about 
their sexual availability that may feed into an accused making the argument that the circumstances 
removed his statutory obligation  to take “all reasonable steps” to ascertain age.118  
 
107 See Grant & Benedet, “Mistake of Age”, supra note 29 at 24. See e.g. Mastel (SKPC), supra note 38 at paras 20–
30; Tannas, supra note 16 at para 35; R v LTP, supra note 38 at para 27; R v (R), supra note 16; Poirier, supra note 
16; Osborne, supra note 31; Chapman, supra note 16; TQBN, supra note 16; Lewis, supra note 16; R v K (RA), 
[1996] NBJ No 104, 1996 CarswellNB 67; Coburn, supra note 16; Chapais, supra note 16; Minzen, supra note 16; 
Wrigley, supra note 16; DO, supra note 16; Vasiloff, supra note 16. It is noteworthy that all of these cases involve 
girls as complainants and none of the three cases involving boys as complainants had a similar statement.  
108 See e.g. R v E, supra note 16 at paras 72, 107–08. 
109 See e.g. Vasiloff, supra note 16 at para 23; Tannas, supra note 16 at para 33; Wrigley, supra note 16 at para 18; 
TQBN, supra note 16 at para 48. 
110 See e.g. DO, supra note 16 at para 17.  
111 See e.g. Chapman, supra note 16 at paras 3, 53. 
112 See e.g. Mastel (SKPC), supra note 38 at paras 28, 30. 
113 See DO, supra note 16 at para 17; Chapman, supra note 16 at para 52.   
114 See e.g. Tannas, supra note 16 at para 8; Vasiloff, supra note 16 at para 23; TQBN, supra note 16 at para 51. 
115 See e.g. Tannas, supra note 16 at para 6.  
116 See e.g. Chapman, supra note 16 at paras 3, 5. 
117 See e.g. Mastel (SKPC), supra note 38 at para 28.  
118 See Tracey Lindberg, Priscilla Campeau & Maria Campbell, “Indigenous Women and Sexual Assault in Canada” 
in Elizabeth Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice and Women’s Activism (Ottawa: University 
of Ottawa Press, 2012) 87. See also Robyn Bourgeois, “Colonial Exploitation: The Canadian State and the 
Trafficking of Indigenous Women and Girls in Canada” (2015) 62:6 UCLA L Rev 1426 at 1442.  
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A finding that doing nothing could ever satisfy taking “all reasonable steps” was already a 
deliberate distortion of Parliament’s unequivocal language in s. 150.1(4). But it was a distortion 
judges could choose to avoid by giving some content to the “all reasonable steps” requirement. 
The Crown in Ontario now faces a bigger problem in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
accused made a subjective choice to disregard age where he has done nothing to ascertain it. The 
Court of Appeal has opened up the likelihood that men who never consider they are having sex 
with a child, because they have relied on such stereotypes to inform themselves, will now be 
entitled to an acquittal even where they have failed to take any steps to ascertain that child’s age. 
An honest belief, even if based on stereotypes, racism, or misogyny, is still an honest belief that 
can undermine a finding of recklessness and entitle a man to an acquittal after Carbone, unless the 
Crown can prove the more onerous standard of wilful blindness.119 The fact that it will be the most 
vulnerable girls who are most directly impacted should concern us all. Our society has deeply 
embedded preconceptions about what is a real sexual assault against a teenage girl, particularly for 
girls who are mischaracterized as the aggressors in sexual interactions with older men.120  
D. Extending Carbone to Mistaken Beliefs in Consent 
  
The reasoning in Carbone could also be relied on by defence counsel to argue that the 
reasonable steps requirement in the consent context for cases involving adult complainants should 
be undermined in the same way. The Supreme Court of Canada decision in R v Barton121 strongly 
supports the assertion that where there is no air of reality to the defence of mistaken belief or where 
the Crown has negated reasonable steps, there can be no defence of mistaken belief in 
 
119 See Sansregret, supra note 101. 
120 See e.g. R v E, supra note 16 at para 93.  
121 2019 SCC 33 [Barton].  
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communicated consent for an accused charged with sexual assault against an adult. The Barton 
Court made clear that where no reasonable steps were taken, there is no defence: 
 
Section 273.2(b) imposes a precondition to the defence of honest but mistaken 
belief in communicated consent — no reasonable steps, no defence. It has both 
objective and subjective dimensions: the accused must take steps that are 
objectively reasonable, and the reasonableness of those steps must be assessed in 
light of the circumstances known to the accused at the time […]. Notably, however, 
s. 273.2(b) does not require the accused to take “all” reasonable steps, unlike the 
analogous restriction on the defence of mistaken belief in legal age imposed under 
s. 150.1(4) of the Code. […]122 
 
 
Barton, like Morrison, was written by Justice Moldaver and released barely two months after 
Morrison. Yet Barton does not even cite to Morrison let alone adopt its reasoning. Barton should 
have settled that Morrison was not intended to limit the reasonable steps requirement in the context 
of consent.  
However, despite this clear statement in Barton, Justice Bennett, writing for the Court 
Martial Appeal Court of Canada in R v MacIntyre,123 relied on Morrison and Barton to undermine 
the reasonable steps requirement in the context of consent. At issue in MacIntyre was whether the 
Crown had to prove that the accused knew the complainant was not consenting, even where there 
was no air of reality to the assertion that he had taken reasonable steps to ground a defence of 
mistaken belief. While the Morrison Court had gone out of its way to stress the uniqueness of the 
 
122 Ibid at para 104 [footnotes omitted; emphasis added]. Barton also endorsed Professor Elizabeth Sheehy’s 
statement that the purpose of the reasonable steps provision dealing with consent was to criminalize sexual assault 
perpetrators whose mistaken belief in consent is based on “self-serving misogynist beliefs.” See Elizabeth A Sheehy, 
“Judges and the Reasonable Steps Requirement: The Judicial Stance on Perpetration Against Unconscious Women” 
in Elizabeth Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice and Women’s Activism (Ottawa: University 
of Ottawa Press, 2012) 483 at 492. I would argue that the reasonable steps test in the context of age is similarly 
intended to prevent men from relying on mistaken beliefs in age that are based on self-serving misogynistic beliefs 
about the sexual availability of children and especially girls. 
123 2019 CMAC 3 [MacIntyre]. 
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sting context for Internet luring, Justice Bennett focused on the similarities between sexual assault 
against an adult and Internet luring in the police sting context and held that: 
The real core of… [Justice Moldaver’s] reasoning was that substituting a defence 
for an element of an offence offends the “bedrock principle of criminal law” that 
the Crown must prove the essential elements of an offence beyond a reasonable 
doubt.124 
 
She went on to hold that the Crown must still prove the mens rea for sexual assault even 
where the accused had failed to raise an air of reality about reasonable steps. To justify this step, 
Justice Bennett relied largely on statements about the mens rea for sexual assault taken from cases 
where mistaken belief in consent was not at issue.125 This decision in MacIntyre came just one 
month after Barton, and while it does refer to Barton, it does so selectively without mentioning 
the above-cited passage. There is no reference in MacIntyre to R v Gagnon,126 where the Supreme 
Court of Canada unanimously upheld a finding by the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada that 
if there is no air of reality to reasonable steps, the defence of mistaken belief in consent cannot go 
to the trier of fact.127  
The Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal in MacIntyre, and the decision has 
not yet been relied on by other appellate courts.128 The clear inconsistency of MacIntyre with the 
 
124 Ibid at para 54 [footnotes omitted].  
125 See R v Handy, 2002 SCC 56; R v JA, 2011 SCC 28; R v Skedden, 2013 ONCA 49. Note that the Court in JA did 
discuss the reasonable steps provision but only in the context of attempting to determine legislative intent about 
advanced consent. The question at issue in MacIntyre, supra note 123 was not discussed in JA.  
126 2018 SCC 41, aff’g 2018 CMAC 1 [Gagnon (SCC)]. 
127 The majority of the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada in Gagnon (CMAC), supra note 31 at para 28 had 
stated: “Parliament decided that the honest but mistaken belief defence is only available to the accused if the 
accused took reasonable steps, under the circumstances, to ascertain the complainant’s consent for each sexual act in 
the course of their activities.” The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with this statement. Note that the Supreme 
Court of Canada in its very brief reasons in Gagnon (SCC), supra note 126 also reaffirmed its decision in George 
(SCC), supra note 15. 
128 See MacIntyre, supra note 123, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 2020 CanLII 229.. As of 12 November 2020, 
CanLII reports that MacIntyre has been cited in two other cases, R v MF, 2020 ONSC 5061 at paras 77-85 and R c 
Bitemo Kifoueti, 2020 QCCQ 5773 (on a different issue).  
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unequivocal language in Barton, and its failure to cite relevant Supreme Court authority, should 
give other courts pause before following the decision. 
V. Conclusion  
 
The result of Carbone is to undermine, at least in Ontario, an important provision enacted 
by Parliament in 1987 as part of a legislative scheme designed to protect children from sexual 
contact with adults.  The “all reasonable steps” requirement in the context of age plays an important 
role in preventing especially adult men from being acquitted for having sex with children where 
they failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain the child’s age.  
Courts are empowered to strike down legislation when it violates the Charter. When it does 
not, supremacy of Parliament is supposed to mean something; legislation should not be effectively 
interpreted out of existence as the courts have done in Morrison for s. 172.1(4) of the Criminal 
Code, in Carbone for s. 150.1(4), and in MacIntyre for s. 273.2(b). Courts should instead do their 
best to give effect to Parliament’s intent in enacting legislation to protect children from sexual 
contact with adults. Parliament has made taking “all reasonable steps” a statutory requirement, and 
no court has ever held that requiring an accused to raise an air of reality about such a requirement 
is unconstitutional. Instead, it has been interpreted out of existence only to be finally laid to rest in 
Ontario by the Court of Appeal in Carbone. 129 
 
129The decision in Carbone came only weeks after the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R v Sullivan, 2020 ONCA 333, 
this time relying on s. 7 of the Charter, struck down s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code, enacted explicitly to protect the 
equality rights of women and children to be free of violence from men who are extremely intoxicated. In Sullivan, at 
paras 56-57, the Court found that the Charter had no meaningful place to consider the safety and equality of women 
and children; instead, the security and equality rights of women and children were relegated to “societal interests” 
only to be considered under s. 1 of the Charter. Section 1 has never been used by an appellate court to uphold a 
violation of s. 7 in the criminal context leaving women and children with no rights even when criminal laws are 
enacted for their protection. 
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One can only hope that other provincial appellate courts, and the Supreme Court of Canada, 
will follow the approach of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia in Angel which takes the 
Morrison Court at its word and allows the “all reasonable steps” provision to have some role in 
prosecutions for sexual abuse against children.130 It is not too much to ask that adults be required 
to do everything reasonably possible to find out how old a child is before seeking out sexual 
activity with that child. Nor is it too much to ask that our courts, where there is no issue of 
constitutionality, respect legislative provisions enacted by Parliament to protect children from 
sexual violence. 
 
130 The Court of Appeal for British Columbia has recently also rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of 
substituting young age for non-consent in s. 150.1. See Alfred, supra note 16. 
